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States is pressing the Department of Defense (DoD) to do more without more resources. In light of this, DoD must develop an affordable and reliable equipping strategy that plans and prioritizes its requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes in order to get the capabilities it needs to achieve the goals and objectives specified in the National Security Strategy (NSS). Cost growth that makes a DoD program unaffordable translates to lost capability to the nation. Over the years, DoD has endured various unfavorable reviews about its ability to manage the defense budget.
The observations of excessive cost growth, unrealistic requirements, and inability to deliver capabilities has reached alarming levels. To address these issues the President and Congress want more accountability within the DoD procurement process. While DoD has implemented some affordability initiatives, more must be done. This SRP examines the need to formulate an equipping strategy underpinned by constrained resources. It concludes with some recommendations.
Affordability: Preventing Cost Growth in DoD's Military Capability Portfolios
This DoD must stop programs that significantly exceed their budget or which spend limited tax dollars to buy more capability than the nation needs. We must ensure that requirements are reasonable and technology is adequately mature to allow DoD to successfully execute the programs.
-Robert M. Gates 1 Former Secretary of Defense 2006 Defense -2011 In the 21 st century, our military capability portfolios continue to be developed to address current and future threats to our national security. The Department of Defense (DoD) will continue to have fiscal pressures exerted on its budgets and DoD leaders will have to make hard decisions on how to make programs in its capability portfolios affordable. Affordability is the cost of capability and when that capability can be provided to the warfighter. The cost reflects the time, talent and resourcing needed to transition a requirement to a capability and ultimately deliver it to the warfighter.
Affordability also reflects the degree to which the system's cost contributes to DoD's long range modernization, force structure, and manpower plans. 2 DoD must balance between its institutional support cost and operational force cost and determine how much common core capability and force structure can DoD afford and what tradeoffs exist. For DoD to meet the challenges of this evolving strategic and fiscal environment, it must develop an affordable equipping strategy that takes into account requirements, capabilities, priorities, risk, and available resources. Cost growth that makes a program unaffordable translates to lost capability to the warfighter. DoD has to make efforts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in its acquisition processes and to prevent the 2 risk of not having the right capability, at the right place and right time to secure national interest.
In this challenging fiscal environment, DoD must maximize efficiencies in its capability portfolios. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), General Martin
Dempsey's strategic direction to the joint force was simple and precise: "We must develop a Joint Force for 2020 that remains ready to answer the Nation's callanytime, anywhere. We need to offset fewer resources with more innovation. We also must confront what being in the profession of arms means in the aftermath of war." 3 In order to achieve affordability in the joint capabilities portfolios, DoD leaders must make choices in the ways requirements, resources, and acquisitions are planned prior to launching new programs to the field. To accomplish this, these leaders should create a culture that fosters fiscal responsibility prior to program start-ups, that reduces the cost of its capability portfolios, and that delivers longterm capabilities that are affordable and sustainable. In such a culture, DoD will then begin to restore its credibility in defense acquisition.
Background On October 16 2006, the President signed into law the Fiscal Year 2007 John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L.). The House Armed Service Committee's report on the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act prior to it being signed into law stated:
The ability of the Department to conduct the large scale acquisitions required to ensure our future national security is a concern of the committee". The committee's concerns extend to all three key components of the acquisition process including requirements generation, acquisition and contracting and financial management.
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DoD's acquisition processes consist of capabilities, resourcing, and acquisition. 5 The acquisition system for identifying capabilities, resources, and acquisition represented in Figure 1 adheres to the principle that the acquisition system must interact to ensure success of a program to meet cost, schedule, and performance need to take a measured approach to bring its strategies to fruition by prioritizing and accepting risk when reassessing its programs within the capability portfoliosaffordability will be of utmost importance.
In September 2008, the DEPSECDEF mandated that all DoD services manage programs in accordance with Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) guidelines. 19 The CPM policy was designed to synchronize and align the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS systems during the planning process that had fundamentally failed in the past to include or operate on the same budget timelines. Of further significance, this imbalance in the DoD's requirements, resource, and acquisition process caused many DoD programs within the capability portfolios to be unaffordable at the start of the program. The such examples. 22 The truth is that cost growth impacts the warfighter and casts a shadow on DoD's requirements, resourcing, and acquisition planning processes. Cost growth must be understood and controlled. DoD's requirements, resourcing, and acquisition process is out of balance, which impacts DoD's ability to procure affordable products, thereby making capability portfolios short in fulfilling requirements identified by the warfighter.
The Acquisition Processes: Requirements, Resourcing and Acquisition
The National Security Strategy (NSS) is a comprehensive report required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 404a. 23 The NSS is prepared by the Executive Branch for Congress; it outlines the major national security concerns and indicates how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The NSS is purposely general in content, and its implementation relies on elaborating guidance provided in supporting documents such as the National Military Strategy (NMS). 24 A valid national strategy must increasingly consider the actions of potential allies and threats, global economic changes, domestic spending needs, foreign policy and aid, and homeland defense. 25 The current NSS cites fiscal responsibility and the need for tough choices on procurements; it also specifies the need to eliminate wasteful spending and duplicative programs. The NSS requires DoD to provide more contract oversight. 26 As such, the President's strategy suggests DoD will be required to scrutinize the programs supporting its capability portfolios and either terminate or restructure those that are outdated, duplicative, ineffective, or simply wasteful. 27 The NMS, derived from the NSS, prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the armed forces. 28 The NMS conveys the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS') advice with regard to the security environment and his specification on military actions needed to protect vital U.S. interests. 29 The United States may not face peer threats in the near to mid-term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining and effective military force to protect U.S. national security interest. 30 The NMS specifies the national military objectives, indicates how to accomplish these objectives, and identifies the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. 31 The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts. The Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) use this guidance to identify desired capabilities to assess the military risks posed in the NMS. 32 The CJCS utilizes the JROC as a joint forum for planning the NMS and to set priorities, to approve capabilities, and to identify needed resources. The CJCS's final decision is then integrated into capability portfolios.
The PPBE process, the JCIDS process and the DAS process make-up DoD's decision support system. The decision support system broadly makes up DOD's overall defense acquisition management framework. It is the framework that defines the acquisition process; its requirements, its priorities, its capabilities, and its resources. 33 The PPBE system is designed to ensure decisions are based on national interest and to deliver desired capabilities consistent with designated cost objectives. PPBE is intended to provide Combatant Commanders with the best mix of forces, equipment, and support within fiscal constraints; the PPBE process shapes DOD's budget for all defense acquisitions. 34 On the other hand, the JCIDS process focuses on capabilities with no cost constraints. The DAS process aim is focused on the development and delivery of a capability to the nation. The DAS process uses affordability analysis to ensure a requirement is economically feasible. 35 So, when these three processes execute serially then gaps and seams inadvertently appear between capability assessments, programming, resourcing, and acquisition. As such, capabilities are determined subjectively by capability portfolio managers and are not constrained to a cost cap. However, resource managers, disconnected from the JCIDS process, provide questionable cost estimates, in an attempt to assure that the capability can be supplied to the warfighter in a given period of time. This inadvertently shifts questionable cost and schedule requirements to acquisition managers who have to manufacture the capability. Then, the vicious cycle of cost growth commences-poor cost estimates are done, unrealistic expectations are 11 created, and often immature technology is folded into the schedule requirement.
As such, acquisition managers are left with managing failing components of a program from their inception.
The procedures within DoD's decision support system inform the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in decisions to identify, to assess, and to prioritize joint military capabilities. Capability portfolio requirements are validated during the JCIDS process;
these validated requirements then inform planners in the PPBE and DAS processes.
The goal of this overall process is to arrive at the right mix of forces, modernizations, and equipment in order to support the goals stipulated in the NSS and NMS. Unless DoD reforms the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes and makes them less bureaucratic and more responsive to cost and schedule constraints, DoD will continue to experience cost and schedule overruns in its capability portfolios. The JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes were designed to synchronize requirements, resourcing, and acquisition in order to meet the goals established in the NSS. 36 Today, the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes are not functioning as their designers intended. The systems rarely intersect during the planning process, and they contribute to cost and schedule overruns in the majority of DoD's programs that are nested in DoD's capability portfolios.
In 2011, Senator John McCain articulated this problem to Congress:
To be clear, the military-industrial-congressional complex does not cause programs to fail. But, it does help create poorly-conceived programsprograms that are so fundamentally unsound that they are doomed to be poorly executed. "By 'poorly conceived', I mean major programs that are allowed to begin despite having insufficiently defined requirements; unrealistic cost or schedule estimates; or unrealistic performance expectations.
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Senator McCain's comments are profoundly accurate. He affirms that the JCIDS, PPBE, and the DAS processes are not crafted in parallel. They rarely intersect during the planning process; they contribute to programs cost and schedule overruns in DoD's capability portfolios. Requirements managers, resource managers, and acquisition managers must conduct and manage these three activities in parallel; they must assure these activities remain balanced and interlocked. The long and difficult task of laboring in the joint force development vineyards is massive and immensely complex. These processes can easily be subjected to different urgencies, priorities, and resource criteria; these interferences then lead to disparate requirements and insufficient resources during the planning phase of the acquisition system. Ultimately they make military capability portfolios unaffordable. The CJCS and the Military Service Chiefs need to acknowledge the threat of the nation's fiscal crisis when designing their modernization strategies; it is currently the major factor in the ways and means is crafted to deliver required capabilities to the field. Therefore, getting requirements, resources, and acquisition processes aligned to the NSS and NMS is becoming more important now as DoD draws down its force structure and shifts to resetting and modernizing the force. Now, DoD's drawdown plans appear to be on par with the drawdown levels the United States has experienced in post-war periods, however the last 12 years of war have depleted modernization accounts and the cost of personnel has risen to over 50%. Making this drawndown unique and decisions on cuts and modernization will have to be prioritized. This is something our nation has not seen in post war periods-DoD cannot cut everything equally, it must make prioritized choices. 38 In the 2012 GAO's annual assessment of the DoD's 2011 capability portfolios, Gene Dodaro, U.S. Comptroller General, reported major acquisition programs had a 13 cost growth of $74B dollars, or 5%, in a one year period. Further, over 60% of programs assessed had lost buying power as measured in increases in program acquisition unit cost (PAUC). 39 Although, GAO and USD AT&L have disagreed in the past on the methodology used to calculate growth, they both agree on using PAUC metric to measure cost growth. 40 These issues of programs' experiencing enormous cost and schedule growth cannot continue as there will be limited resources in the future to bail the programs out. In 2013, defense spending will drop to 3.3 % of the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2010, defense spending was 4.7% of the nation's GDP.
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In 2013, it is projected that the OCO funds will be reduced to $82.5B, down from the nearly $115 billion in 2012. 42 DoD has an on-going internal cost growth in its operation and maintenance (O&M) and military personnel accounts. These internal cost growths are reducing DoD's purchasing power and this limits DoD's ability to procure the quantity of weapon systems it needs to fill its capability portfolios-buying less with less is not an affordable business model. In the future, Military Services will not have the luxury to return to Congress and request additional resources for their failing programs.
If program cost growth trends continue, then DoD will have to offset its cost and schedule overruns by restructuring, terminating or eliminating products in its capability portfolios. There simply won't be the additional resources provided through an overarching concern regarding the requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes. 44 They believe that current requirements, resourcing, and acquisition processes are not interlinked and rarely intersect. 45 The acquisition system does a fairly good job of identifying required capabilities, but it does not do an adequate job on informing leadership on the affordability of such required capabilities.
So What Changes Are Needed in Defense Acquisition
DoD has been haunted with the fact that acquisition reform has not taken much traction in defense spending over the last 60 years. Therefore, DoD must institute changes in its organizations, its culture, and its business practices to ensure national and military strategy is linked to affordable programs. First, the organizational structure in the JROC needs revisited and a consortium of joint experts formed to make informed investments in the modernization accounts. Secondly, DoD and all the Military Services must create a culture which will address affordability throughout the acquisition system in order to control cost growth. suited as enablers to resource these joint strategic choices. 47 This strategic shift from
Military Service-managed capability portfolios to a CCDR-managed capability portfolios can preserve DoD's modernization accounts and it also can mitigate interservice rivalry.
It is clear the DoD and the Services need to develop integrated plans to address the rising costs in defense spending. In contrast, it is unclear whether the JICT's or the CCDR's concepts mentioned above would produce cost savings. However, it is all too clear that the current practices are not producing a measurable reduction in the cost of DoD's requirements, resourcing, and acquisition process. The balance between available national resources and national security needs has never been more delicate.
The pending defense cuts of nearly $259B between 2013-2017 will force DoD to reconsider its defense strategy or its defense spending. Changing the defense strategy now is not warranted given the security threats facing the nation. So, defense spending reform is the most feasible solution-how DoD implements this reform within its vast array of acquisition organizations is still unclear. Once DoD's strategic leaders adopt negotiations techniques in its acquisition planning and it looks for opportunities to find solutions that address mutual interests DoD will begin to create short term wins and set a path for long term wins in its modernization programs. The traditional approach of one community drawing a line in the sand to force either a win-lose or lose-lose decision does not benefit the warfighter, DoD, the taxpayer or the nation. Most people won't go on the journey of making tough choices during reform periods if they are not seeing compelling evidence within six to eighteen months that the journey is producing expected results. 59 The F-35 program is a perfect example of how inadequate negotiations between military-industry-congress contributed to cost overruns, schedule delays and ill conceived requirements which all combined contributed to growing product's unit acquisition cost to prohibitive levels.
As shown in Figure 2 , a programs typical acquisition path with consistent and predicable resources, requirements, and acquisition, compared to an acquisition path whereas frequent changes, unstable design, late requirement changes lead to late longer delivery and higher cost to a program. The F-16 followed the typical acquisition path and it was considered a successful program. Packard used interpersonal skills and created a climate where realistic requirements were agreed too. Packard's interpersonal skills flowed into the execution phase of the F-16 program and contributed to keeping cost and schedules to acceptable levels. Building partnerships with the requirements community is an area of continuing emphasis, but more needs to be done. More than anything else, requirements drive cost. The requirements and acquisition communities must cooperate more closely and continuously to ensure that requirements are technically achievable and affordable so that operational and Service leadership can make informed decisions about their acquisition programs. 61 Cultural and organizational changes can influence the affordability of DoD programs, however, these two changes will be the most difficult to achieve. If DoD can change its cultural and organizational behaviors then changes in its business practices will have a better chance of succeeding too.
Business Practice Changes
To address affordability, JROC could direct its functional control boards to review its capability portfolios and make plans to reduce redundant capabilities amongst the services. The Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment / J8
can then examine and modify investment and procurement portfolios and acquire a 23 broader understanding of requirements driving investments across portfolios. Such a review will also inform senior DoD officials of over investments and under investments in its capabilities portfolios. The savings from these on-going reviews will be accrued over time. Reconciliations of redundancies are not intended to save a specified amount of the base budget or to defend an investment. Rather reconciliations ensure funds are programmed, budgeted, and executed according to validated requirements. These reviews provide opportunities to preserve cost and identify acceptable risk to meet the goals and objectives specified in the NSS and NMS. while supporting modernization planning, and while reducing life cycle costs associated with capability portfolios. Until the JROC has developed and fully documented an approach for prioritizing capability needs and aligning these needs with available resources it will not be in the best position to align resources with priorities or balance costs with benefits in affordable investment plans. 64 Today, the Air Force and Army UASs are employed to conduct offensive, irregular warfare by means of high value target and high value individual prosecution. 65 USD AT&L has stated that a new business practice of reducing redundant capability portfolios will save DoD significant resources by synergistically using joint assets, by leveraging the industrial base, and by normalizing the logistics footprint. 66 As such, if the Army and Air Force consolidate their portfolio it can bring win-win solutions to DoD.
Either service has the capacity and capability to be the executive agent for the UAS program so that is not the issue. The concern is that there are too many different types of UAS systems being built. 
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The CJCS needs to conduct a joint portfolio review for all its services' UAS The USD AT&L is taking refreshing and forward thinking approaches to determine whether acquisition programs begin, by addressing and analyzing affordability during the requirements, resourcing, and acquisition planning process.
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USD AT&L is cultivating a culture of change, specifically in the area of affordability. On
November 13 2012, USD AT&L, Frank Kendall issued BBP 2.0-Continuing the Pursuit for Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending. His direction to the DoD acquisition workforce was to continue to focus on: enforcing affordability caps on programs, building stronger partnerships with the requirements community, using the technology development phase to reduce risk for new starts, identifying and reducing redundant capability, and increasing the cost consciousness of the acquisition workforce-change the culture. 75 The basic goal of BBP 1.0 and 2.0 is to deliver better value to the taxpayer and the warfighter by improving the way DoD conducts business. 76 Given the cloud of uncertainty hovering over our national economy DoD must continue to institutionalize these initiatives during the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes. Without this level of implementation then DoD policies will most likely fade in importance, thereby transformation and modernization of DoD's force structure will literally not materialize.
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Conclusion
Developing time-tested joint capability portfolio reviews obliges DoD leaders to build a consensus on what is needed in the field and what is affordable. DoD leaders need to prioritize "must have" requirements against "desired" requirements in the context of available resources. DoD leaders have become accustomed to building capability portfolios without much regard for the product's affordability. DoD leaders need to address affordability throughout the JCIDS, PPBE, and DAS processes. The acquisition system should provide DoD with the ability to analyze, prioritize, and resource the services' capabilities and inform the services on where to take acceptable risks. Even though DoD has implemented some affordability initiatives, more must be done to improve affordability across the requirements, resourcing, and acquisition process. If affordability is not accurately addressed specifically in the planning phase, then it will be difficult to produce the military capacity and capability needed to fight and decisively win America's wars. Cost growth that makes a DoD program unaffordable translates to lost defense capacity and capability to the nation. Our military capability portfolios will continue to be developed to address current and future threats to our national security. The current economical frailty plaguing the United States is pressing DoD to do more without more resources. The observations of cost growth, unrealistic requirements, and inability to deliver capabilities have reached alarming levels. While DoD has implemented some affordability initiatives, more must be done across organizational, cultural, and business practices lines of effort. Only then will DoD meet the goals and objectives articulated in the NSS and NMS.
